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ABSTRACT

During 2015, approximately 201 U.S. companies decided to go public in order to
gain capital in return for stock shares. Out of these 201 companies, 127 companies left an
average of $46.5 million dollar on the table as a result of underpricing. There is a plethora
of literature that shows underpricing is a result of many different variables, yet few analyze
how underwriters relate to IPO underpricing. Through the use of correlation matrices,
means difference tests, simple regressions, and multivariate regressions, this study finds
that there is no statistically significant trend between underwriters and money left on the
table. However, one point of interest for future studies would be to analyze the
effectiveness of Singular Lead Underwriters versus Multiple Lead Underwriters while
controlling for prestigious investment banks.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1602, the Dutch East India Trading company produced a groundbreaking idea
that would forever change the landscape of business. Their primary source of revenue came
from sailing around the world to gather highly sought-after goods. With ships being pirated
for their loot or lost to an unforgiving sea, the Dutch East India Trading company realized
they were in grave financial risk if they wanted to keep funding these expeditions. In order
to stay afloat, literally and figuratively, they sought out investors in exchange for a
percentage of their company. This event is considered to be the first publicly traded
company, therefore making it the first Initial Public Offering (IPO). Much has changed
over the past 400 years, although conceptually the ideas pushing these types of financial
events remain the same.
In 2015, there were over 200 U.S. IPOs, which allowed companies to gain capital
from investors in return for partial ownership. 2015 companies such as Fitbit saw an
opportunity to sell shares to public markets and increase their capital. When a company
chooses to go public, they are most often underwritten by a large investment bank. With
the assistance of large investment firms such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, or
Morgan Stanley, companies going public can reduce their legal workload while mitigating
their risk through an underwriter. However, a company going public may have multiple
underwriters forming a syndicate in order to diffuse the risk amongst multiple investment
banking firms.
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As a company tries to find the right underwriter(s) to bring their shares to the public,
many factors are considered, such as the issuing company’s price, size, age, number of
shares, and industry. Companies that are recently incorporated or ones that already have a
large net worth pose a higher risk due to respective margins of error. Although there are
numerous factors that influence how an underwriter would price an IPO, these underwriters
spend enormous amounts of money and hours trying to perfect this process. These
underwriters or syndicates use many different techniques from analyzing cash flows,
growth, or earnings per share, comparing the current company to others in the past, and
checking dividend payments, if applicable, using a discounted dividend model. When the
issuing company decides how many shares and at what price they would like to offer, the
underwriter agrees to purchase the shares being allocated to the public market. Once the
company’s issuing date arrives and the company goes public, then the underwriter resells
them at a slightly higher price known as the underwriter spread.
Despite all of these valuation methods from well-renowned underwriters, even
seasoned investment firms continue to misprice the value of shares when underwriting
IPOs. An underwriter could overestimate the offer price resulting in a decrease in share
price once a company’s shares hit the market. If an underwriter underprices the offer
amount for an IPO, then the market would increase the share price to the fair value. In the
latter scenario, the price increase multiplied by the number of shares offered is considered
Money Left on the Table (MLOT). Even though this is an increase in share price, it is often
an unrecognized loss for these companies because they were not valued accurately initially
and therefore never received the capital. The term “Money Left on the Table” is referred
to by Loughran and Ritter (2004) as the difference between the first closing ask price minus
2

the original offer price multiplied by the number of shares sold. The prevalence of
companies leaving enormous amounts of money on the table is all too common across the
market.
Highly reputable investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley, are responsible for
some of the most infamous examples of MLOT. Loughran and Ritter (2002) describe the
process of Morgan Stanley underwriting the IPO for Netscape in August of 1995. With an
approximate 108% increase in price on the first day, Netscape left $151 million on the table
as a result of Morgan Stanley’s egregious underpricing. Netscape went on to retain them
as their underwriter for a follow up offer that took place in November of 1996.
Many investors do not realize how much more capital the company could gain
because most investors are happy with the superficial gain in personal wealth due to a stock
price increase according to Loughran and Ritter (2004). It is because of this universal
mindset that most people make a tradeoff between the gain of their personal stock and
MLOT. Rosenboom (2012) suggests that an underwriter’s decision on how much to resell
the shares for on the primary market affects money left on the table. Others, such as
Loughran and Ritter (2004), believe it is a result of a revision to the offer price after the
preliminary prospectus. This study serves the purpose to fill a gap in analyzing the MLOT
phenomenon by analyzing 2015 U.S. IPOs number of Underwriters, All-Star
Underwriters, Lead Underwriters, Lead All-Star Underwriters, and Singular Lead AllStars versus Multiple Leads with an All-Star.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many academic journals have proven that IPOs, in general, are underpriced. There
have been a multitude of studies that are dedicating to assessing how and why IPOs are
underpriced.
Numerous scholars believe that underpricing is a deliberate strategic plan executed by
managers of the firm going public and their underwriters. Hakenes and Nevries (2000)
initially developed a model studying how underpriced IPOs may generate more media
coverage. This additional coverage for a company going public would attract new
customers looking to expose an arbitrage situation, and in return, increase the intrinsic
value of the stock due to an increase in demand. Boehemer and Fishe (2004) continued off
of this analysis to develop an alternative theory. They created a model to analyze if strategic
underpricing, by the underwriter, creates a higher trade volume for a company going
public. Higher trade volume would be highly beneficial to the underwriters for they hold
the majority of shares being released to the public. With the underwriter being a basic
market-maker, underwriters would be able to benefit from the increase in trade volume due
to higher demand. Yet, their model showed no benefit of systematic underpricing for the
underwriter. Aggrawal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) studied how managerial
shareholding correlate with the IPO underpricing. Their model disproves the model
presented by Hakenes and Nevries (2000) and shows that IPO underpricing is harmful to a
firm’s intrinsic value. They found a positive correlation between managers that have a high
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amount of shareholding and first-day underpricing. Their theory for this is that managers
of a firm going public strategically underprice the value of the firm in order to get a higher
personal gain in wealth.
Carpenter and Strauser (1971) studied firms going public and the advice that they
receive from their auditors. They report that auditors of IPOs were suggesting that firms
going public should change from local or regional underwriters to nationally recognized
underwriters. Through the change to more prestigious underwriters that have national
attention, they believe it instills a public perception of a higher quality IPO. If the public
were then to believe that this IPO is of higher quality, then they would be willing to pay a
higher price in order to gain access to its shares. Logue (1973) attributes underpricing to
be a result of information asymmetry. With a firm going public for the first time, there is a
high amount of uncertainty within the market about that firm. He continues to explain that
firms going public may seek out a prestigious investment banking firm. By having a
prestigious bank bringing a company to the market, he believes that it may instill
confidence into that IPO. Investors would then assume that IPOs with prestigious
underwriters have information of which the public is unaware, therefore inducing people
to believe it is a good investment and to enter at a higher share price. Both Carpenter and
Strauser (1971) and Logue (1973) explain that IPOs that are partnered with prestigious and
well-known investment banking firms are viewed as more favorable to the public, which
could increase their intrinsic value.
Titman and Trueman (1986) examine how more prestigious underwriters influence
information about the firm they are bringing public. Their analysis shows that the
information in regards to valuation is important, yet having a prestigious underwriter shows
5

a greater influence. An IPO with a higher-level underwriter indicates to the market that
there is a more careful valuation. They conclude that this may account for some
underpricing, yet it does not completely cover the scope of the issue. Carter and Manaster
(1990) develop a more accurate way to assess a prestigious underwriter’s influence on an
IPO. They create a system that ranks some of the more well-known underwriters with their
associated reputation. Their conclusion is that prestigious underwriters are associated with
lower risk IPOs, therefore creating a market of investors that do not seek information about
the IPO. By marketing a less risky IPO through a prestigious underwriter, underwriters are
able to maintain their reputation. Since these IPOs are viewed as having less risk
associated, investors feel that they are well-informed about the IPO and its price. With less
perceived risk and more ‘accurate’ pricing, there is less price run-up once the firm goes
public, thus reducing MLOT.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) examine how IPO underpricing has grown since the
turn of the century. They theorize that part of the underpricing issue could be because
prestigious national investment banking firms are phasing out regional banks in the lead
underwriting positions. During the internet bubble of 1999-2000, first-day returns were
around 65% showing huge amounts of underpricing. They argue that these high amounts
of money left on the table are due to firms going public being complacent with this loss.
Continuing with their theory, firms going public may incur MLOT as an indirect cost for
having more reputable investment banking firms as their underwriters in order to boost
public perception of the IPO.
Corwin and Schultz (2005) studied how having more members in an underwriter
syndicate effects an IPO offer price. Their study found that an IPO with a greater number
6

of underwriters has a tendency to revise the offer price from the amount filed originally.
Hu and Ritter (2007) analyze how price revisions affect the amount of money left on the
table. Their empirical findings show that each additional underwriter increases the offer
price for an IPO by 1%. They continue on to explain that IPOs that revise their offer price,
prior to going public, left $23 million on the table whereas the average IPO from their study
left approximately $9 million on the table. Other academic papers like those of Bradley
and Jordan (2019) study different variables of shares allocated to the public, price revisions,
and Venture capital-back firms. Their empirical finding shows that IPO underpricing can
be predicted using price amendments as indicators. An amendment of filing price accounts
for approximately 13% of the variation in underpricing in their model.
The purpose of this study is to test how underwriters and all-star underwriters,
within different underwriter positions, affects the amount of money left on the table. Allstar underwriters are investment banking firms that received a reputation ranking of seven
or higher in Ritter (2004). Logically, more underwriters would provide a higher level of
assessment for a firm’s intrinsic value therefore reducing underpricing. Having the
presence of prestigious investment banking firms (all-stars) should also reduce the amount
of money left on the table, because they are more reputable firms with a higher level of
expertise.
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CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Number of Total Underwriters
Hypothesis 1) IPOs that have a higher number of Total Underwriters will result in lower
amounts of Money Left on the Table.
Underwriters are in charge of facilitating a company’s transition to becoming a
public enterprise. Once a company and underwriter agree to bring shares to the public; the
underwriter is in charge of the entire process, from start to finish. Legal consultation,
valuation of the shares, promotion, and assumption of risk are all duties of the investment
banking firm. While this is a wide array of responsibilities to fulfill, these underwriters are
massive financial conglomerates that rely on highly skilled individuals to make these
decisions on their behalf. Through this diffusion of risk and having other investment
banking firms present, one would assume that more diligent and accurate valuation
methods would be present with more underwriters.
Corwin and Schultz (2005) studied how having more members in an underwriter
syndicate affects an IPO offer price. Their study found that an IPO with a greater number
of underwriters has a tendency to revise the offer price from the amount filed originally.
According to Hu and Ritter (2007), having an IPO underwritten by multiple book runners
is a recent upward trend since 2001. This syndication allows for lower coordination costs
and helps reduce risk through its dispersal amongst the multiple investment banking firms.
However, Hu and Ritter (2007) also shows that each additional underwriter raises the
8

middle point of the filling price by 2.8% and 1% for the offer price. The upward revision
of a price has an influence with the amount of money left on the table as IPOs with upward
revision of share price resulted in an average of $23 million lost to underpricing. More
MLOT as a result of upward price revision is due to the underwriters lack of confidence in
the valuation of the company’s share price. Therefore, an IPO that has more underwriters,
which contributes to an upward price revision, should leave more money on the table. Yet,
this is not logical, for having more underwriters should contribute to more accurate
information, thus reducing underpricing through creating a fair valuation.
Even with specialization, access to incredibly powerful tools, and seasoned
experience, these underwriters still struggle to make a fair offer price. There can be a
general analysis for trends of underpricing against the total number of underwriters used
for an IPO because of this initial hypothesis. A wide scope of how underwriters influence
MLOT will create an effective starting point where more elaborate hypotheses can be
revealed for different variables.

3.2. Number of Total All-Star Underwriters
Hypothesis 2) IPOs that have a greater number of Total All-Star Underwriters will result
in lower amounts of Money Left on the Table.
As an IPO makes its selection of underwriters, they may be tempted to include a
highly reputable investment banking firm. Carter and Manaster (1990) created a ranking
for investment banking firms in order to analyze why IPOs choose more prestigious
bankers to bring their firm public. Their theory continues to say that IPOs seek out
reputable investment banking firms in order to reduce the IPOs public perception as a risky
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investment. The model created for their study shows that there is a positive correlation
between prestigious investment banking firms and low risk IPOs. If these All-Star
Underwriters are associated with less risky IPOs, than there will be less price run-up which
would reduce underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2004) create a more recent underwriter
reputation ranking that acknowledges adjustment from the original data of Carter and
Manaster (1990). Through the use of these ranking systems, this study analyzes the effect
of having underwriters that are all-stars (rank 7.0 and greater) on how much money is left
on the table.
Cliff and Denis (2004) explain how IPOs indirectly pay for All-Star Underwriters
through money left on the table. They continue to explain how after a firm goes public, the
underwriters provide analyst coverage on the performance of the IPO. Analyst coverage
contributes to the success of a firm’s stock price when it comes from prestigious investment
banking firms. Therefore, a company going public ignores the money left on the table in
order to receive analyst coverage about their upward trending stock from these all-stars,
which boosts the public perception of both parties involved.
Due to this gap of knowledge, the second, and more focused hypothesis, of this
study is based on how the Number of All-Star Underwriters influences an IPOs
underpricing. There will be an analysis of how the Number of All-Star Underwriters
involved in the syndicate of an IPO will affect how much money a firm leaves on the table.
Logically, more highly reputable investment banking firms would result in a higher level
of expertise and therefore, a more accurate offer amount reducing MLOT.
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3.3 All-Stars in a Lead Underwriter Position
Hypothesis 3) IPOs with a greater number of Lead All-Star Underwriters will reduce
MLOT in the highest amount.
Sharma and Seraphim (2010) studied IPOs in the Indian market to see if having an
all-star in the syndicate would help narrow the gap of underpricing. They found that there
was an inverse relationship between IPOs with reputable investment banking firms and
underpricing. Additionally, they found that an offer price was more rationally valuated
when performed by all-star underwriters. Furthermore, they suggested that IPOs without
an all-star should form a syndicate of multiple underwriters in order to try and replicate the
results. Yet, they did not analyze how having a Lead All-Star Underwriter would influence
the accuracy of an IPO’s offer price.
Mola and Loughran (2004) found that in a seasoned equity offering, bringing more
shares public for a company that is already publicly traded, it is more likely to have
underpricing if the lead underwriters are considered all-stars. Yet, this study did not analyze
how Lead All-Star Underwriters impact underpricing for an IPO. Neither Carter and
Manaster (1990) or Loughran and Ritter (2004) analyze if having more all-stars in a lead
underwriting position is beneficial to an IPO. For this hypothesis, IPOs with a greater
number of Lead All-Stars Underwriters are considered to have a higher amount of expertise
than the rest of the field. Yet, Liu and Ritter (2011) provide empirical evidence that IPOs
are more underpriced when they receive coverage from an all-star analyst that has expertise
in an industry. However, this defies the simple logic for an IPO to seek out a Lead All-Star
Underwriter, for having a prestigious underwriter in the lead position should drastically
reduce the amount of MLOT. If an IPO has a greater number of Lead All-Stars
11

Underwriters, than additional expertise should lower MLOT, in the highest amount, if there
are more prestigious investment banking firms in a lead position.

3.4 Multiple Lead Underwriters with All-Star(s) and Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter
Hypothesis 4) IPOs having Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star or a Singular
Lead All-Star Underwriter will leave less money on the table than the rest of IPOs.
Between 2001 and 2010, nearly half of all IPOs in the United States were managed
by a syndicate of underwriters that had more than one lead underwriter according to Jeon,
Lee, Nasser, and Via (2013). With Hu and Ritter (2007) describing that more and more
IPOs have been using syndicates as their preference, this study saw an opportunity to
research these two specific groups. Adding the variables of a Singular Lead All-Star versus
Multiple Leads with an All-Star could provide more insight into what underwriter construct
produces the most accurately priced IPO.
When bringing these private companies public to the primary market, there is
usually a Lead Underwriter that assumes most of the risk for this company. In some
situations, the Lead Underwriter is a singular investment banking firm that assumes all of
the risk for the company that it is bringing public. On the other hand, Multiple Lead
Underwriters evaluating the company and issuing the shares is very common. From the
two scenarios, another element is added so that there may be a more in-depth analysis. For
the IPOs that have Multiple Lead Underwriters (any amount greater than one), sub-groups
were created for Multiple Lead Underwriters that contained an All-Star and those that did
not. With the Singular Lead Underwriters, they are separated into sub-groups where the
Singular Lead Underwriter was either an All-Star or not.
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The original intuition of this hypothesis is that any IPO that has an all-star in the
lead position, multiple or singular, would leave less money on the table than its counterpart.
Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter should be the most effective representative from the
group of IPOs that have one lead underwriter due to the prestigious sole underwriter.
Additionally, the study chose to use a Multiple Lead Underwriter with an All-Star, because
it allows the inclusion of IPOs that have multiple lead underwriters and only one All-Star.
These Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star may have more than one prestigious
bank, however they should still be the best representatives from the IPOs with multiple
investment banks in the lead role. Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star should also
leave less money on the table than singular leads due to an increase of resources and
capabilities that are at the helm of bringing a stock public.
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CHAPTER IV

SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

The sample selection used in the analysis begins on January 1, 2015 and continues
until December 31, 2015. The sample period focuses on all of the Initial Public Offerings
in the United States during this time, which was over 200 companies. This was almost
immediately narrowed down to 177 companies due to some issues with data. All of these
companies were traded on the NASDAQ and the NYSE with the exception of a few.
Through the NASDAQ’s online database, this study was able to access information about
these IPOs and the characteristics surrounding them. The companies were manually
entered into an Excel sheet in the order they went public. After acquiring the names of the
companies, the data set expanded to their respective tickers, date of publicity, offer price,
and shares offered. All of the variables were available through the NASDAQ database,
with the exception of a few companies, which required manual entry to their respective
company in Excel.
NASDAQ’s database also allowed the data set to include the total Number of
Underwriters to have a base reference as to how many total investment firms were involved
in any of the IPOs. The names of all Underwriters were included, along with a column that
was to represent the numerical amount of the IPO’s syndicate. The total Number of Lead
Underwriters was made into a different data entry as they were distinguished in
NASDAQ’s database. There was also a numerical column created for the total Number of
Lead Underwriters in order to have a continuous variable for later analysis. All the
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information gathered through the NASDAQ database was hard data that had to be
collected, transferred, and organized manually into Excel.
Using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the data set grew to
include the Permanent Number (a unique identification number) and the Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) code to allow for some more distinct characteristics about the existing
data. The Center for Research in Security Prices also gave the final closing ask price for
the day that a company administered its IPO. Receiving the first day closing ask price was
a vital step for the study because it allowed for the Money Left on the Table column to be
calculated for meaningful data. CRSP provided a more seamless transition into the working
data set as these values were selected in the database then exported into an Excel sheet.
When running initial descriptive statistics and simple regressions, the numbers
returned seemed to be heavily skewed by some of the values. Upon revisiting the original
data set, this study saw that there were negative data values in the Money Left on the Table
column that are a result of overpricing. While overpricing is still a pertinent issue for IPOs
and the underwriters pricing them, this study’s scope is more focused on MLOT which is
due to underpricing. This paper addresses the different effects of overpricing and
underpricing on companies going public in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. It is because of this
discrepancy that a separate data set was created including only the positive values for
MLOT (an underpriced offer amount). This data set still has all of the same characteristics
of the original data set but includes only 127 companies with positive amounts of money
left on the table. It is for this reason that all tables and regressions, except for the
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices, are from the ‘Positive’ data set. The
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Positive data set will be the most pertinent to this study, however it is important that all
IPO data from 2015 be acknowledged.

4.1 2015 Initial Public Offerings
The initial number of 201 companies was a very substantial original data set to
analyze. However, some of these companies were removed from the data set for a number
of reasons. After these discrepancies, the number of companies from 2015 remaining in the
positive data set had dropped down to a total sample of 127. Out of the 127 companies, 89
companies were traded on the NASDAQ and the remaining 38 companies were traded on
the NYSE.
The major components of an Initial Public Offering are offer (share) price, shares
offered, and the offer amount. The offer amount is dependent on its two inputs being offer
price and shares offered.
Offer Amount = Offer (Share) Price * Shares Offered
Table 1A of the Appendix A (see Appendices for all future tables) reports descriptive
statistics for the IPOs of 2015 from the Positive data set. For share price, the mean was
$15.26 with a maximum value of $52.00 and a minimum value of $4.00 per share. The
mean number of shares offered to public had a mean of 10,185,263 shares, with a maximum
of 48,000,000 shares and a minimum of 683,250 shares. In regard to offer amount, the
mean was $171,409,830 with a maximum of $1,203,500,000 and a minimum of
$4,099,500. The offer amount had a high standard deviation of $210,783,386, showing that
there is a skew in the data as a result of a very high offer amount.
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4.2 Underwriters and Lead Underwriters
After the total Number of Underwriters was assigned to each company, the Number
of Lead Underwriters was extracted and entered as a separate data column. In reference to
Panel A of Table 1 for descriptive statistics on Positive Data Underwriters, the median
number of total underwriters was four with a maximum of 17 and a minimum of one. For
lead underwriters, the median was two with a maximum of five and a minimum of one.
The median value is used in future calculations because the mean is not an integer and
using fractions of underwriters is not a realistic value. It is through the creation of these
inputs that this study aims to use the continuous variables as points of immediate
comparison for money left on the table. Take Facebook, for example, which went public
in May of 2012. When going public, Facebook had three lead underwriters and 34 total
underwriters bringing them public. To date, Facebook is known as one of the most
disastrous IPOs due to the underwriters not being able to create an accurate price, and
constantly revising it prior to going public.
4.2.1 All-Star Underwriters
The All-Star variable was then added to the data for a more accurate representation
of how a more reputable investment banking firm may be able to influence a fair share
price. In reference to the Carter and Manaster (1990) reputation ranking, along with the
edits made by Ritter (2004), this study was able to determine Number of All-Star
Underwriters for 2015 U.S IPOs. Both Carter and Manaster and Ritter describe an All-Star
underwriter to have a reputation ranking of eight and above (on a scale of zero to nine).
Yet, our study decided to change the cut-off to any underwriter with a ranking of seven to
nine in order to widen the scope of all-stars. It was through referencing this document and
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the data described in the former paragraph that the Number of All-Star Underwriters came
to fruition. Table 1B shows that the median Number of All-Star Underwriters is three with
a maximum of 12 and a minimum of zero.

4.2.2 Lead All-Star Underwriters
In order to distinguish an IPO’s underwriter even further, the Lead All-Star Underwriter
variable was created. A Lead All-Star Underwriter is an investment banking firm that is
distinguished as the lead underwriter, singular or multiple leads, and has a reputation
ranking based on Ritter (2004) greater than or equal to seven. Just as an IPO may have
multiple All-Star Underwriters, they may also have multiple Lead All-Star Underwriters
as some larger IPOs usually have a syndicate bringing them public. Panel A of Table 1
shows that of the mean of Lead All-Star Underwriter is 1.56 with a median of two. Any
IPO with more than two Lead All-Star Underwriter is going beyond the benchmark of Lead
All-Star Underwriter and should have less underpricing.
4.2.3 Singular and Multiple Underwriters
In addition to this data about All-Star Underwriters and Lead All-Star Underwriter,
this study saw an opportunity to give further differentiation to these existing values. In
order to have a more efficient way to distinguish Singular Lead Underwriters from
Multiple Lead Underwriters, the study turned to binary codes. For an IPO that has one
investment banking underwriter, like Presbia LLC, the column for singular lead (SL)
would be assigned a ‘1’ and the multiple leads (ML) column would have a ‘0’ value. If
there was an IPO that had five lead underwriters, like Patriot National Corp., then the SL
column would receive a ‘0’ and the multiple leads (ML) would get a ‘1.’
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The data set also included binary options to show whether the IPO had a lead allstar underwriter within the SL and ML columns. Respectively, if the singular lead
underwriter is an all-star (seven or greater on the Ritter Rank) then that data entry would
be assigned a ‘1’ to the Singular Lead All-Star (SL All-Star) and the Multiple Lead All-Star
column would receive a ‘0’. If any of the Multiple Lead Underwriters are an all-star, then
the SL All-Star column would receive a ‘0’ and the multiple lead all-star (ML All-Star)
would get a ‘1’. If there are singular lead underwriters or multiple lead underwriters that
did not have a lead all-star present, then they would receive a ‘0’. See the example 1 below
of how the data entries were made. Also note that the table above has removed some
elements of the data set in order to convey a clearer depiction of the underwriter formatting.
Data Example 1: Other Columns and Variables Removed to Show Underwriter
Formatting

Firm Name

Number of Underwriters Total Number of AllStars Is SL an All-Star Are any of ML an All-Star Total Number of Lead Underwriters Total Number of Lead AllStars

COUNTY BANCORP, INC.
PATRIOT NATIONAL, INC.

2
5

1
3

0
0

1
1

2
3

1
1

It is from the various data entries that this study aims to create a supplemental
comparison of how underwriters may influence the amount of money left on the table.
Since the aim of this study is rather large in its scope, breaking down the underwriters into
subgroups was a logical step for evaluating data. Also, in efforts to make data more
digestible, the subgroups were made so that there is a clear point of comparison between
the two; i.e., having a lead all-star underwriter or not. Different subgroups are a vital factor
for this study because it allows for the separation of data and results for clear
interpretations.
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4.3 Money Left on the Table
The MLOT variable is the most crucial to this study. The origination of this variable
came from multiple academic journals that address how underpricing results in higher
amounts of MLOT. It starts with the underwriters accepting to take a company, and its
shares, to the public market. From there, the investment banking firm assesses the
company’s financial statements and performs valuation methods (those mentioned earlier
in the paper) to reach a “fair” market price. Once the investment banking firm has
determined the market value of an IPO’s shares, the underwriter then purchases those
shares from the company going public at that price. In assuming this risk, the underwriter
must be compensated, therefore a small premium is added to each share price. The new
share price, including the premium, then hits the market with the underwriter pocketing
each premium for all of the shares they are technically reselling. However, this premium is
not accounted for in MLOT, because the determinants of MLOT are once the shares go
public. An IPO leaves money on the table when they enter the market at the offer price,
determined by the underwriter, and there is a large increase in share price during the first
day of trading.
Example: MLOT comes into action once the stock actually hits the market. Take
Company XYZ that has an underwriter determining that its offer price should be $10 per
share for 1,000 shares. Company XYZ then goes public at $10 per share and within seconds
the market has shot the price of Company XYZ’s stock up to $20 per share. At this point
in time, the market has self-corrected the share price of Company XYZ through the process
of arbitrage. Arbitrage is when any buyer/seller seeks an opportunity to exploit a good that
is mispriced. In the case of Company XYZ, a buyer would purchase the share at $10 only

20

to immediately sell it back into the market at $20, because they believe there is someone
willing to pay that price. Through arbitrage, the market has revealed Company XYZ’s
shares to have an intrinsic value of $20 per share. In this scenario, Company XYZ saw a
100% increase in their share price, but as a result left approximately $10,000 on the table.
While Company XYZ did not have a realized loss, they lost the opportunity for their shares
to be sold at the intrinsic value of $20 which would have given them $20,000 of initial
capital, as opposed to the realized $10,000 they received.
Once the participants in the market have used arbitrage strategies to expose an
underpriced asset, the share price is now at what the market considers to be the intrinsic
value. At the end of the first day when a company goes public there is a final closing ask
price from the seller of the security. The closing ask price is the lowest price at which a
seller of the stock is willing to execute the trade. The first day closing ask price minus the
original offer price creates the difference for the IPO. Taking the spread multiplied by the
number of shares brought to the public gives the amount of money left on the table:
Money Left on the Table = (Final Ask Price - Offer Price) * Number of Shares
Offered
While this example is very controlled and may not address some other factors such
as hot markets or industries, it still creates a picture about how much money a firm could
miss out on as a result of underpricing. If most IPOs were to be fairly evaluated and have
an accurate offer price, then these companies with millions of shares would see a much
larger capital production. Scenarios, such as Company XYZ, are the reason that this study
is focusing on the effects of underwriters with money left on the table.
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4.3.1 Mispricing IPOs – Overpricing
The calculation featured above could result in a negative value depending on the
IPOs pricing and performance. If an underwriter were to vastly overprice the offer amount,
and there was a low final ask price, then the result of the above equation would be a
negative number. However, this negative number is not money left on the table, but rather
a loss to the company. This is important to acknowledge because Purnanandam,
Amiyatosh, and Swaminathan (2004) find that the median US IPO firm is overvalued by
about 50% relative to the industry that the company participates in. Therefore, if an entire
industry, like pharmaceuticals, is overvalued than IPO overpricing may occur. The reason
that these negative values remain in a different data set is because they still harm the
company that is going public. Even though the number is negative, that does not mean
underwriters were more accurate in their pricing than those that left money on the table.
Underwriters are still responsible for the drop in stock price because of their overpricing.
In reference to Table 1B for the descriptive statistics (including the original 177
IPOs for 2015), the minimum amount for the money left on the table variable is a bit
misleading. It is technically not money left on the table; it is actually an opportunity cost
that the company going public incurs. Furthermore, the term ‘minimum’ is a bit confusing
because this is actually the maximum amount that a 2015 company loss due to overpricing.
Yet, the least amount of money lost as a result of overpricing was $80,000 which is the
most accurate pricing in 2015 and was for Ritter Pharmaceuticals.

22

4.3.2 Mispricing IPOs – Underpricing
On the other end of the spectrum are the positive values which is the orthodox
MLOT. Entered into their own data set, the Positive Data allows for an analysis that only
deals with IPOs that had MLOT as a result of their underwriters underpricing the IPO offer
amount. With the underwriting valuing the offer price below the fair value, a situation of
money being left on the table is created. Ritter and Loughran (2002) claim that IPOs on
average are underpriced which means that there is a higher chance of most IPOs leaving
money on the table. Even though these values are positive, and that the company saw a
gain in their stock price, it can still be considered a loss. To paint a more accurate picture,
return to the Netscape example presented in the introduction.
Referenced in Loughran and Ritter (2002):
...cofounder James Clark held 9.34 million shares (of Netscape). Based on the
midpoint of the file price range of $12-$14, the expected value of his Netscape
holdings was $121 Million at the time that the preliminary prospectus was filed. At
the closing market price on the first day of trading, his shares were worth $544
million, a 350% increase in his pretax wealth in the course of a few weeks. So, at
the same time that he discovered that he had been diluted more than necessary due
to the large amount of the money left on the table, he discovered that his wealth had
increased by hundreds of millions of dollars. Since he owned 28.2% of the company
before going public, $43 million of the $151 million wealth transfer from pre issue
shareholders to the new investors came out of his pocket. After the offering, he
owned 24.5% of Netscape, but if the same proceeds had been raised by selling 2.4
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million shares at $58.25 instead of 5.0 million shares at $28.00, he would have
owned 26.3%. (420)
This is a real example of how underpricing an IPO can affect much more than just
the share price. Mr. Clark ended up having an enormous personal gain in wealth but his
actual influence in Netscape diminished as a result of systematic underpricing by Morgan
Stanley. This incremental change in his percentage owned may not appear to be too
detrimental, but when dealing with a company worth approximately $3 billion, the pennies
tend to stack rather quickly. Having the Positive data set dedicated to analyzing MLOT
allows for this study to use these numbers in a plethora of ways.
Referencing Table 1A for descriptive statistics on MLOT, it can be seen that the
mean amount in 2015 was a whopping $46,583,540. Looking at the same table, the median
for MLOT is approximately $16 million. This is a very appropriate distribution for this
variable because Loughran and Ritter (2002) show empirically that the average amount of
money left is much higher than the median due to a few IPOs with large amounts of MLOT.
To further this point, the standard deviation of this variable is $70,490,226. The maximum
amount of MLOT is $359,532,250 with the Fitbit IPO. Within the ‘Positive’ data set, there
was IPO that was priced perfectly (Franklin Financial Network) resulting in the minimum
being zero.
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CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

5.1 Correlation Matrices
Simple correlation matrices were used to see the relationship of certain inputs
against others. The inputs were as follows: Number of Shares, Offer Amount, Number of
Underwriters, Number of All-Stars, and Money Left on the Table. Number of Shares and
Offer Amount were chosen because it is assumed these factors contribute to the amount of
Money Left on the Table. In reference to Panel A of Table 2, Number of shares had a
correlation of 0.59 against MLOT, which is reasonable considering IPOs with more shares
have a higher proportional risk. This situation is similar with offer amount, which has a
correlation of 0.55 to MLOT. Again, this was not a surprise as companies that have a higher
offer amount will be inherently tougher to value and have more risk associated with
valuation. It is also important to note that with these two situations (Number of Shares &
Offer Amount) there is a margin of error with pricing an IPO. As these two variables
increase, so does the margin of error because of their size and complexity, which could
contribute to MLOT.
Number of Underwriters and All-Stars were chosen to be the additional variables
to align with the focus of this study. Table 2A shows that the number of underwriters has
a correlation of 0.3 with MLOT. While this correlation does not seem to be too strong, it
is still correlated with a medium strength. Many other factors contribute to MLOT, but as
Panel A of Table 2 shows, there is a relationship between Number of Underwriters and
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MLOT, ceteris paribus. This is higher than the same correlation in Panel B of Table 2,
because the negative values of MLOT were pulling the mean down, therefore showing a
weaker correlation. Even with the negative values present there is still a small correlation
between Number of Underwriters, ceteris paribus.
Having the Number of All-Stars variable addresses the correlation between MLOT
and how many all-stars were present for an IPO. Panel A of Table 2 shows that there is
actually a higher correlation with MLOT and Number of All-stars than the relationship
described in the former paragraph. Number of All-Stars has a 0.328 correlation at a medium
level, ceteris paribus. This is a very interesting correlation assuming that highly reputable
underwriters should be the ones performing at a higher level and leaving less money on
the table, as a result. Again, it is very reasonable that the correlation for this variable is
higher in Table 2A than Table 2B, because of the negative MLOT values skewing the
correlation. This is one of the reasons why this study created a positive data set.

5.2 Difference Tests
Difference tests are used in this study to provide important statistics to compare
different groups within a singular variable. It is used by taking one dependent variable and
creating a parameter to produce two sub-groups. From there the independent variable of
MLOT is analyzed for both groups and then compared. This simple test gives a chart for
number of IPOs on either end of the parameter, the mean MLOT for each group, and the
statistical significance of these results. This study used this tool to assess multiple
dependent variables all against the amount of MLOT for the respective group.
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5.2.1 Means Test for Number of Underwriters
A sample means test was constructed with the dependent variable being the Number
of Underwriters with MLOT as the mean being tested. This test was constructed by
breaking the Number of Underwriters’ variable into two subgroups: above or at and below
to the median Number of Underwriters from the positive data set. Using the median of four
is more effective because it is an integer and would not cause any discrepancies within the
data. In reference to Table 4A, the number of IPOs with underwriters above the median is
58, and the number of IPOs with underwriters at or below the median is 69. For the IPOs
above the median Number of Underwriters, the average amount of MLOT is $66,743,019.
Whereas the IPOs at or below the median Number of Underwriters had a mean of
$29,637,891 MLOT. This is a statistically significant result with a p-value .003, which is
significant at the three-star level.
This difference test shows that there is a pretty even distribution of IPOs between
the Number of Underwriters above or at and below the median. It also shows that, ceteris
paribus, IPOs that have underwriters above the median leave, on average, more than double
what the IPOs below the median Number of Underwriters do in regard to MLOT. In this
situation, more underwriters do not reduce the amount of MLOT; they actually increase it,
all else equal. Therefore, IPOs should use fewer underwriters if they want to reduce their
chance of underpricing, ceteris paribus.

5.2.2 Means Test for Number of All-Stars
The next variable tested using a difference test was for the total Number of All-Stars
present on an IPO. As mentioned in Table 1B, the median Number of All-Stars from the
positive data set is three all-stars. The median number was chosen for a few reasons, the
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first being that you cannot have a portion of an underwriter. It was decided that the
parameters for these two tests were any IPOs having more than the median Number of AllStars and the other IPOs that were either at or below the median of three. This study chose
to have the lower bound to be at or below the median, because the IPOs that are at or below
were in a similar circumstance of not having excess All-Stars. Yet, any IPO that goes
beyond the median of three All-star Underwriters should be receiving extraordinary
coverage from these additional all-stars, therefore reducing underpricing. Using MLOT as
the independent variable, the test was constructed to see if there were any statistically
significant differences between the MLOT for IPOs having a Number of All-Stars greater
than the median and those that do not.
This test provides this study with a statistically significant result. In reference to
Table 4B, the amount of observations above the median of three all-star underwriters is
51 companies. The number of IPOs at or below the median of three all-star underwriters
is 76. The mean amount of MLOT for those above the median is $66,995,447, and for the
companies at or below the median Number of All-Stars the mean is $32,886,075. The
difference in MLOT between the two groups’ averages was $34,109,371.
On average, IPOs with a total amount of all-stars above the median leave
approximately $34 million more on the table than IPOs with all-stars amounting from zero
to three. Table 4B has a t-stat of 2.74 and a p-value of .007, showing that this is a statically
significant result at the three-star level. With this level of significance, it can be said that
there is a notable difference with the average MLOT between the two groups. To
extrapolate, IPOs that have four or more all-star underwriters underprice an IPO’s offer
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amount with an accuracy that averages to $34 million more MLOT than those with fewer
or no all-stars, ceteris paribus.

5.2.3 Means Test for Number of Lead All-Stars
In line with the hypothesis development, the next testable dependent variable is the
number of Lead All-Stars. This specific test analyzes the effect of having more lead
underwriters that are all-stars on the amount of MLOT. Table 1B shows that the median
number of Lead All-Stars is two, which is why this study uses zero to two for the lower
bound. It would be fair to assume that having an all-star, or multiple, in the lead
underwriting position would create a more accurate IPO offer price, thus reducing the
amount of MLOT.
Table 4C shows the difference of means test for this dependent variable. The
sample amount that is above the median of two Lead All-Stars shows that there are only
20 IPOs from the positive data set fitting these criteria. The remaining 107 have two or less
Lead All-Stars present for their IPOs. The mean amount of MLOT for an IPO above the
median for Lead All-Stars is $62,110,105 while those below the median had a mean of
$43,681,378. Between these two sub-groups the difference of means was $18,428,726,
which did not produce any results considered to be statistically significant. The t-stat was
1.07 with a p-value of 0.285. Even though these results are not statistically noteworthy,
they still hold weight within the research questions of this study. For the positive data set
of 2015 IPOs, it was learned that having more Lead All-Stars does not influence MLOT in
either increasing it or reducing it. This returns to the concept of how much more sought
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after these all-star investment banking firms are for companies going public, yet Lead AllStars underwriters make no beneficial impact for accurate pricing.
5.2.4 Means Test for the Singular Lead All-Star
After creating all of the inputs for the original data set, an additionally binary
element was added for close juxtaposition. If there was only one lead underwriter, then
that IPO was given a ‘1’ for the ‘Singular Lead’ column. Additionally, in order to
distinguish these underwriters further, another binary column of ‘Singular Lead All-Star?’
was created. A 2015 IPO like Invitae Corp. was brought public with J.P. Morgan as the
sole lead underwriter. For Invitae Corp. both the ‘Singular Lead?’ and ‘Singular Lead AllStar?’ would have binary entries of ‘1’ to indicate their positive relation with these
descriptions.
Table 4D shows the difference test between the means of IPOs that had Singular
Lead All-Stars and those that did not (Singular Lead Non-All-Star or Multiple Leads).
There were only 19 IPOs that had an All-Star in the sole lead underwriting position and
averaged $83,031,380 for MLOT, whereas the 108 IPOs not having a Singular Lead AllStar had an average of $40,171,420 for MLOT. This produced a statistically significant
result that has a t-stat of 2.494 and a p-value of .014 which is significant at the three-star
level. With Carter and Manaster (1990) saying that prestigious investment banking firms
are less likely to take on risky IPOs, this number should be much lower than the rest of the
fields. This means test for MLOT shows that Singular Lead All-Stars leave almost double
the amount of MLOT compared to IPOs that have: Singular Lead Non-All-Stars, Multiple
Leads without all-stars, and Multiple Leads with an All-Star. When analyzing this situation
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in a vacuum, Singular Lead All-Stars are, on average, half as effective in accurately pricing
an IPO compared to the other potential lead underwriting groups.
5.2.5 Means Test for Multiple Lead All-Stars
Table 4E has a very similar setup to the Table 4D with the only difference being
that the dependent variable is now Multiple Leads with an All-Star. The binary entries are
still used for both columns to represent their respective positive indication. For example,
an IPO could have three lead underwriters with only one all-star and would produce a ‘1’
in both the ‘Multiple Leads?’ and the ‘Multiple Leads with an All-Star?’ columns. This
decision was made because an all-star underwriter being part of multiple lead underwriters
should ideally have more accurate pricing of IPOs than singular leads (All-star and NonAll-Star) and Multiple Leads without an All-Star. Continuing with Carter and Manaster
(1990), if prestigious underwriters only associate with less risky IPOs, then an IPO that has
Multiple Leads with an All-Star should have accurate pricing. Having multiple lead
underwriters and having at least one of them being an all-star should create the ideal
complexion for firms going public.
Referencing back to Table 4E, it shows that the sample number (from the positive
data set) of IPOs with Multiple Lead underwriters that include at least one all-star is 92
companies, while there are 35 IPOs that did not fit this description (Singular Leads,
Singular Lead All-Stars, and Multiple Leads with no all-stars). The mean amount of MLOT
for Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star is $45,010,306, whereas the opposing
group had a mean of $50,718,897. The difference between these two groups was $5,708,590, showing that Multiple Lead Underwriters with an all-star had less MLOT.
Table 4E shows that this not statistically significance in the sense of their differences due
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to a -0.47 T-stat and a 0.685 P-value. Yet, compared to the rest of the sample group,
Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star were the most effective in producing an
accurate offer when assessing their means for MLOT.

5.2.6 Means Test for Number of Lead Underwriters
The final difference test was made to analyze how the number of Lead
Underwriters influences the amount of MLOT, ceteris paribus. Table 1B for the
descriptive statistics of the Positive Data set shows that the median number of Lead
Underwriters is two. To keep with the pattern of the past difference tests, the lower bound
of the test consists of zero to two (median) Lead Underwriters. Any amount of Lead
Underwriters greater than the median of two is the upper group for they should be receiving
higher than normal coverage from three or more Lead Underwriters.
Table 4F shows that the number of IPOs with Lead Underwriters higher than the
median is 34 companies. There are 93 companies that had two or less Lead Underwriters.
The mean amount of MLOT by the group having more Lead Underwriters than the median
is $54,012,341. For the IPOs having two or less Lead Underwriters, the amount of MLOT
had a mean of $43,867,634. This amounts to a difference of $10,144,706, which proves to
be not a significant result because of a 0.72 t-stat and a 0.475 p-value. However, it can still
be seen that having more Lead Underwriters does not necessarily make a difference in how
much money is left on the table when compared to those with one to two Lead
Underwriters, ceteris paribus.
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5.3 Regressions Analysis
These simple regressions were made with the data analysis function in Excel. They
were performed only using the data from the Positive set and using MLOT as the
independent variable. The purpose of this analysis is to see that if, ceteris paribus, there is
a statistically significant correlation between MLOT and the dependent variable. These
graphs also show how the dependent variables would influence the amount of money left
on the table through the coefficient that is respective to them, all else equal.

5.3.1 Number of Underwriters
Simple regressions were created to see if the data provided was statistically
significant when regressed against the independent variable of MLOT. The Number of
Underwriters that an IPO has is the dependent variable for this regression. When testing it,
there was a statistically significant result for how the number of underwriters relates to the
amount of MLOT. In reference to Table 3A, there is a p-value of 0.0004 which is at the
three-star significance level. This simple regression has an initial intercept of $10,305,596
for MLOT and each additional underwriter increases the amount of MLOT by increments
of $6,735,817, ceteris paribus. IPOs for larger companies may have more underwriters and
MLOT due to their high amount of complexity and risk. However, this regression still
shows that there is a statistically significant result for MLOT being associated with more
underwriters.

5.3.2 Number of All-Stars
Using the same regression analysis tool in Excel, the independent variable of
MLOT is constant, while the dependent variable is the Number of All-Stars participating
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in an IPO. this regression also produced a statistically significant result, like the test prior.
In reference to Table 3B, there is a p-value of 0.0001 for this regression which is at the
three-star significance level. Table 3B shows the initial intercept for MLOT is $17,044,217
and each additional All-Star Underwriter increases the MLOT by increments of
$8,411,421, ceteris paribus. Both the intercept and the variable associated with the Number
of All-Stars are higher than that of the Number of Underwriters. This may be because there
are fewer All-Stars than underwriters, in general, which would increase these values
respectively. IPOs that are less risky are associated with prestigious investment banks and
have an inverse relationship with underpricing. Yet, this model for the Positive data set of
2015 IPOs show that there is a positive relationship with MLOT and the Number of AllStars with a three-star significance, ceteris paribus.

5.3.3 Number of Lead Underwriters
Through the regression analysis tool in Excel, the amount of Money Left on the
Table is along the Y-axis, with the dependent variable of Number of Lead Underwriters on
the X-axis. Table 3C shows the results of this analysis and provides this study with a result
that is not statistically significant. With a p-value of 0.65184 and a t-stat of -0.453, this
study can deduce that there is no influential correlation between the Number of Lead
Underwriters and how much money is left on the table as a result of underpricing.
However, Table 3C does show that as the Number of Lead Underwriters has an inverse
relationship with MLOT. As the Number of Lead Underwriters increases in singular
increments, the amount of money left on the table is reduced by $3,496,529. A reduction
in money left on the table per increase in Number of Lead Underwriters is a very
34

understandable relationship. This negative value is the first hint of an underwriter doing a
beneficial job in producing a fair price, resulting in a lower amount of MLOT for an IPO,
ceteris paribus. Having a reduction of MLOT per increase of Lead Underwriter is why this
study broke an IPO’s underwriters into sub groups so that they may be tested individually.
Therefore, a more specific version of this test is applied to the next category.

5.3.4 Number of Lead All-Stars
With the independent variable remaining as MLOT, the dependent variable for
this regression is the number of all-stars that are in a lead underwriter position. Unlike the
first two regression tests, this test was not statistically significant. In reference to Table
4D, there is a p-value of 0.136 which is outside the realm of statistically significant
results. However, this finding can still prove to be very important to this study.
Extrapolating off of the regression results for this dependent variable, it shows that the
Number of Lead All-Stars has no influence on MLOT, ceteris paribus. Meaning that
having an All-Star in a lead underwriting position neither benefits nor harm the IPO.
These All-Stars with high reputations, charge high fees, and turn away companies that
seem undesirable. Yet, if this Number of Lead All-Stars is not making a difference in the
amount of MLOT, then companies seeking underwriters to go public should pursue lower
level investment banking firms. Table 4C shows in comparison, that having more Lead
Underwriters as opposed to Lead All-Stars would provide a more accurate pricing for a
2015 U.S. IPO, ceteris paribus.
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5.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis
The final test for this study was to use a multivariate regression analysis in order to
encompass all the variables being tested. Due to the hypothesis development described in
Chapter II of this paper, the variables chosen for this test were: Offer amount, Number of
Underwriters, Number of All-Star Underwriters, Number of Lead Underwriters, and
Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters. These variables were thought of as the most
influential in this spotlight study on Underwriters and their influence of MLOT. However,
offer amount was included because a higher offer amount usually results in more MLOT,
so it adds an additional control for testing the other variables. For this multivariable
regression analysis, the independent variable is MLOT. The chart shows how these five
variables influence the amount of MLOT altogether, not as isolated dependent variables.
Table 5 shows the output for this multivariate regression analysis using the coding
program Statistical Analysis System (SAS). SAS takes all of these dependent variables and
calculates their influence on the intercept (MLOT) while balancing for each dependent
variable’s respective affect. This means that certain dependent variables have more
influence on MLOT when isolated or in a vacuum, as opposed to the multivariate
regression analysis which allows this study to see how all of these variables, when tested
together, influence the amount of MLOT for the Positive data 2015 U.S. IPOs.
Table 5 shows how all of these dependent variables come together. The first
variable being offer amount is statistically significant, which is not a shock, for an IPO
with a higher offer amount will have more MLOT due to their larger margin for error. None
of the dependent variables thereafter are statistically significant, yet they still shine light
on how underwriters can influence MLOT. In this model, the Number of Underwriters
36

shows that each incremental increase in the total number of investment banking firms
actually decreases the amount of MLOT by $264,162 per underwriter. Table 5 also shows
that each additional All-Star Underwriter decreases the amount of MLOT by increments
of $4,589,297. Next, the Number of Lead All-Stars actually reduces the most amount of
money per increase in the dependent variable. Every additional Lead All-Star Underwriter
assists in more accurate pricing which reduces the amount of MLOT by increments of
$11,965,029. Finally, the Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters increases the amount of
MLOT with each increase of the variable. For every additional Lead All-Star that 2015
IPOs had, the amount of MLOT will increase by increments of $11,277,245.
While none of these variables, besides offer amount, prove to be statistically
significant results, this multivariable regression analysis still helps develop a wider picture
for the process of underwriting an IPO. Table 5 shows that having more underwriters, as
part of a syndicate, does produce a more accurate IPO price, but is not as effective as other
dependent variables in this analysis. Having more All-Star Underwriters participating in
an IPO does reduce the amount of MLOT, however having an All-Star in a lead
underwriting position produces more MLOT, ceteris paribus. In this regression, it shows
that for 2015 IPOs having more Lead All-Star Underwriter was not advantageous. Table 5
also shows that the most successful IPOs from 2015 were companies that had multiple AllStar Underwriters as part of syndicate and multiple Lead Underwriters that were not AllStars. This correlates with the Means Difference test from Table 4E as Multiple Lead
Underwriters with an All-Star had the most effective pricing of 2015 IPOs.

37

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In 2015, there were 201 companies that brought their enterprises to the public
market in order to produce capital through the process of an Initial Public Offering. When
these companies want to publicly exchange shares for capital on the public market, they
are most often underwritten by a large investment banking firm. These underwriters
provide companies seeking to go public with legal expertise, risk aversion, and the
knowledge to price the shares for the IPO. However, most of these IPOs are dramatically
underpriced resulting in a spread between the offer price and the final closing price on the
first-day of trading. This spread results in Money Left on the Table, which is a loss in
potential capital that goes unnoticed because of a more superficial gain in wealth. This
study serves to fill a gap in knowledge about whether or not underwriters actually assisted
a 2015 U.S. IPO with the amount of MLOT when going public.
The aim of this paper is to understand how Underwriters, Lead Underwriters, AllStar Underwriters, Lead All-Star Underwriters, and Singular Lead All-Star Underwriters
versus Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star all influence how much Money is left
on the Table for 2015 IPOs. Through the creation of data sets that incorporated multiple
variables and different sub-groups, this study deduced that there is no statistically
significant empirical result between these groups of underwriters and how they influenced
MLOT.
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However, there were certain aspects of this study that proved to be highlights of
interest. Simple regressions from Tables 3A and 3B show that there are statistically
significant results when testing the amount of MLOT against the Number of Underwriters
and the Total Number of All-Stars, respectively (ceteris paribus). In the Means difference
test these two variables had a tendency to leave more money on the table, yet when
incorporated into the Multivariate Regression Analysis it showed to have the inverse effect.
The Total Number of All-Stars succeeded in lowering the amount of MLOT when analyzed
in the multivariate mode.
The Number of Lead Underwriters proved to be the most consistent variable
through all of the tests. This group showed no significance in the Table 3F, resulting in no
benefits associated with a greater Number of Lead Underwriters. Yet, when entered into
the multivariate regression they reduced the most money left on the table per additional
Lead Underwriter.
The Total Number of Lead All-Stars actually increased the amount of money left
on the table. However, ceteris paribus, the means difference test in Table 3D does show
that IPOs for 2015 with a Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter had the poorest methodology
of accurate pricing. Against the rest of the data field, the 19 IPOs with a Singular Lead AllStar Underwriter averaged more than double the amount of MLOT as all of the other
groups. Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star were the most successful group in
analyzing the fair price of an IPO. The Means Difference test in Table 3E shows that there
is no statistical significance for this result, yet Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star
had the lowest average.
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While the findings of this study were underwhelming in their statistical
significance, the purpose of this study still has merit in its contribution to future studies. It
is the hope that an additional study will be done on how underwriters, All-Stars and not,
influence the amount of MLOT relative to the IPOs offer amount. Appendix B shows the
means difference tests for each distinctive group, yet the number is a percentage of the
firm’s MLOT relative to their respective offer amount. Future studies will be able to control
for proportional risk through the use of this standardized metric.
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APPENDIX A: CHARTS AND FIGURES
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs
A) Descriptive Statistics of IPOs for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table values only)
Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs - Positives Only (N= 127)
Variable
Share Price
Number of Shares
Offer Amount
Money Left on the Table
MLOT/Offer Amount

Mean
$
$
$

Median

15.26 $
10,185,263.39
171,409,830.96 $
46,583,540.25 $
30.07%

15.00 $
6,550,000.00
96,900,000.00 $
16,032,000.00 $
16.25%

Std Dev
6.95 $
9,698,587.70
210,783,386.05 $
70,490,226.44 $
38.96%

Maximum
52.00 $
48,000,000.00
1,203,500,000.00 $
359,532,250.00
218.00%

Minimum
4.00
683,250.00
4,099,500.00
0.00%

B) Descriptive Statistics of Underwritrers for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table
values only)
Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs - Positives Only (N= 127)
Variable
Number of Underwriters
Total Number of All-Stars
Total Number of Lead Underwriters
Total Number of Lead All-Stars
Money Left on the Table
MLOT/Offer Amount

Mean

$

Median

5.39
3.56
2.11
1.56
45,725,963.03 $
30.07%

4.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
15,681,000.00 $
16.25%

Std Dev

Maximum

3.26
2.77
0.84
0.97
71,274,443.18 $
38.96%

17.00
12.00
5.00
4.00
359,532,250.00
218.00%

Minimum
1.00
1.00
0.00%

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs (Continued)
C) Descriptive Statistics of IPOs for Original Data Set (Positive and Negative values)

Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs (N = 177)
Variable
Share Price
Number of Shares
Offer Amount
Money Left on the Table
MLOT/Offer Amount

Mean
$
$
$

Median
Std Dev
Maximum
Minimum
14.91 $
14.00 $
7.99 $
68.56 $
4.00
10,660,163
6,365,000
14,608,120
160,000,000
683,250
175,015,332.00 $ 88,235,280.00 $ 265,837,707.00 $ 2,560,000,000.00 $ 4,099,500.00
30,610,219 $ 5,400,000 $ 65,192,952 $
359,532,250 $ (57,101,000)
18.93%
7.80%
37.73%
218.00%
-38.46%
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D) Descriptive Statistics of Underwriters for Original Data Set (Positive and Negative values)
Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs (N = 177)
Variable
Total Number of Underwriters
Total Number of All-Star Underwriters
Total Number of Lead Underwriters
Total Number of All-Star Lead Underwriters
Money Left on the Table
MLOT/Offer Amount

Mean

$

Median

5.39
3.34
2.18
1.53
30,610,219 $
18.93%

Std Dev

4.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
5,400,000 $
7.80%

Maximum
Minimum
3.23
17.00
1.00
2.75
12.00
0.00
0.95
6.00
1.00
1.06
5.00
0.00
65,192,952 $ 359,532,250 $ (57,101,000)
37.73%
218.00%
-38.46%

TABLE 2: Correlation Matrices for 2015 IPOs
A) Correlation Matrix for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table values only)
Correlation Matrix - Positive Data Set
Number of Shares Offer Amount Number of Underwriters Total Number of All-Stars Money Left on the Table
Number of Shares
Offer Amount
Number of Underwriters
Total Number of All-Stars
Money Left on the Table

1
0.87046

1

0.59665

0.69422

1

0.59939

0.71490

0.91960

1

0.59097

0.55087

0.30695

0.32795

1

B) Correlation Matrix for Original Data Set (Positive & Negative Money Left on the Table values)
Correlation Matrix - Original Data Set
Number of Shares Offer Amount Number of Underwriters Total Number of All-Stars Money Left on the Table
Number of Shares
Offer Amount
Number of Underwriters
Total Number of All-Stars
Money Left on the Table

1
0.93551

1

0.57127

0.66084

1

0.52481

0.64051

0.90072

1

0.24339

0.29356

0.21167

0.27080

TABLE 3: Means Difference Test for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set
A) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Underwriters

$

Total Number of Underwriters
>=5
0-4
n = 58
n = 69
Mean
Mean
Difference
66,743,019.52 $
29,637,891.00 $37,105,128.52
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t-stat p-value
3.05 0.003

1

TABLE 3: Means Difference Test for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued)
B) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of All-Star Underwriters

Total Number of All-Star Underwriters
>=4
0-3
n = 51
n = 76
Mean
Mean
Difference
66,995,447.87 $
32,886,075.92 $34,109,371.95

$

t-stat p-value
2.74 0.007

C) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters

Total Number of Lead All-Star Underwriter
>=3
0-2
n = 20
n = 107
Mean
Mean
Difference
t-stat p-value
62,110,105.18 $
43,681,378.58 $18,428,726.61 1.07 0.285

$

D) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Singular Lead All-Star Underwriters

Singular Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
SL All-Stars
NO SL All-Stars
n = 19
n = 108
Mean
Mean
Difference
t-stat p-value
$ 83,031,380.62 $
40,171,420.18 $ 42,859,960.44 2.49 0.014
E) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Multiple Leads with an All-Star Underwriter

Multiple Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
ML All-Stars
No ML All-Stars
n = 92
n = 35
$

Mean
45,010,306.63 $

Mean
50,718,897.19

Difference
-$5,708,590.57

t-stat p-value
-0.41 0.685

F) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Lead Underwriters

$

Total Number of Lead Underwriters
>=3
0-2
n = 34
n = 93
Mean
Mean
Difference
54,012,341.27 $
43,867,634.50 $10,144,706.77
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t-stat p-value
0.72 0.475

TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set
A) Regression Analysis for Number of Underwriters and Money Left on the Table

Regression Analysis - Number of Underwriters
VARIABLE
Intercept
Number of Underwriters

Coefficients

Standard Error

p-value

11,702,295.58

0.881

0.3802

6,735,817.13

1,868,030.26

3.606

0.0004

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

t-stat

10,305,596.03

0.307
0.094
0.087
67,355,236.52
127

Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 1
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TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued)
B) Regression Analysis for Number of All-Star Underwriters and Money Left on the Table

Regression Analysis - Number of All-Star Underwriters
VARIABLE
Intercept
Total Number of All-Stars

Coefficients

Standard Error

t-stat

p-value

17,044,217.64

9,649,811.45

1.766

0.0798

8,411,421.46

2,167,169.23

3.881

0.0002

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.328
0.108
0.100
66,857,514.28
127

Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 2

Money Left on the Table

Number of All-Stars Line Fit Plot
400000000
350000000

Money Left on the Table

300000000
250000000

Predicted Money Left on the
Table

200000000
150000000
100000000
50000000
0
0

5
10
Total Number of AllStars

15
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TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued)
C) Regression Analysis for Number of Lead Underwriters and Money Left on the Table

Regression Analysis - Number of Lead Underwriters
VARIABLE

Coefficients

Standard Error

Intercept
Total Number of Lead Underwriters

53,934,509.56

17,422,041.64

3.09576

0.00242

(3,496,528.47)

7,730,739.70

-0.45229

0.65184

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.040
0.002
-0.006
70,713,786.96
127

Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 3

Number of Lead Underwriters Line Fit Plot
Money Left on the Table

400000000
350000000
300000000

Money Left on the Table

250000000
200000000

Predicted Money Left on the
Table

150000000
100000000
50000000
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Total Number of Lead Underwriters
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t-stat

p-value

TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued)
D) Regression Analysis for Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters and Money Left on the Table

Regression Analysis - Number of Lead All-Stars
VARIABLE
Intercept
Number of Lead All-Stars

Coefficients

Standard Error

31,316,267.78

11,935,560.60

2.62378

0.00978

9,792,644.46

6,532,234.31

1.49913

0.13636

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.040
0.002
-0.006
70,713,786.96
127

Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 4
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t-stat

p-value

TABLE 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis for 2015 IPOs (Positive Data Only)

Multivariate Regression Analysis for 2015 IPOs (Positive Data Set)
VARIABLE
Intercept
Offer Amount
Number of Underwriters
Number of All-Stars
Underwriters
Number of Lead
Underwriters
Number of Lead All-Stars
Underwriters

DF

Parameter Estimate Standard Error
1

34,341,485

16,615,183

p-value

2.07

0.0409

5.96

<.0001

1

0.21793

1

(264,162)

4,770,991

-0.06

0.9559

1

(4,589,297)

6,461,156

-0.71

0.4789

1

(11,965,029)

10,303,295

-1.16

0.2478

1

11,277,245

10,671,613

1.06

0.2927

Root MSE
Dependent
Mean
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
Coeff Var

0.03658

t-stat

59,206,261
46,583,540
0.3225
0.2945
127.09695
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND FIGURES

Table 6: Means Difference Tests for 2015 IPOs (Percentage Data from MLOT/Offer Amount)

A) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Underwriters

Total Number of Underwriters Above or Below Median
>=5
n = 58
Mean
26.22%

0-4
n = 69
Mean
33.31%

Difference
-7.09%

t-stat
-1.021

p-value
0.002

B) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of All-Star
Underwriters

Total Number of All-Star Underwriters Above or Below Median
>=4
n = 51
Mean
26.92%

0-3
n = 76
Mean
32.18%

Difference
-5.26%

t-stat
-0.745

p-value
0.004

C) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Lead All-Star
Underwriters

Lead Underwriters All-Stars Above or Below Median
>=3
n = 20
Mean
25.46%

0-2
n = 107
Mean
30.93%

Difference
-5.47%
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t-stat
-0.575

p-value
0.078

Table 6: Means Difference Tests for 2015 IPOs (Percentage Data from MLOT/Offer Amount) Continued
D) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Singular Lead All-Star Underwriters

Singular Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
SL All-Stars
n = 19
Mean
28.15%

No SL All-Star
n = 108
Mean
30.40%

Difference
-2.25%

t-stat
-0.231

p-value
0.601

E) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Multiple Leads with an All-Star
Underwriter

Multiple Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
ML All-Stars
n = 92
Mean
26.63%

No ML All-Star
n = 35
Mean
39.11%

Difference
-12.48%

t-stat
-1.62

p-value
0.006

F) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Lead Underwriters

Total Number of Lead Underwriters
>=3
n = 34
Mean
23.79%

0-2
n = 93
Mean
32.37%

Difference
-8.58%
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t-stat
-1.1

p-value
0.009
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